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White Rabbit, opened in July 2009, is one of the city’s only privately owned, non-
commercial galleries. The exhibition represents the a small portion of owner Judith Neilson’s 
private collection, one that she has been gathering in frequent trips to China over the past 
nine years; the museum space is a concerted attempt to share her fascination with the art of a 
new generation of Chinese artists working in the context of a country in the process of 
enormous economic, social and cultural metamorphoses. The art featured has been produced 
exclusively since the year 2000, in addition, almost every artist exhibited lives and works in 
China. Although situated in Sydney, White Rabbit is a cultural outpost that provides a unique 
reflection of China’s artistic self analysis. The focus of this article is not to weigh the 
significance of this cultural space against the contextual background of its physical location, 
rather, this article aims to use the critical perspectives of the artists represented in White 
Rabbit as a platform from which to investigate China’s cultural identity. This notion of 
cultural identity is paramount to an understanding of China today; the current generation of 
Chinese people have grown up within a society constantly redefining itself against the 
ideological backdrop of modernity and postmodernity. In summary, this article will attempt 
to synthesise the most pertinent definitions of China’s constantly shifting cultural identity, 
and in doing so will come to a definition of its own. 
 
Any assessment of China today must begin with an examination of the present dialogue 
between the forces of the modern and postmodern. Before this is explained, it is important to 
note that when considering Chinese modernity and postmodernity one must dismiss the 
involuntary associations one makes with the historicised movements of modernism and 
postmodernism that are inseparable from a Western historical and social context. Although 
similar to Western constructions at an ideological level, Chinese constructions of modernity 
and postmodernity exist in a historical narrative that bears no relation to its Western 
equivalent. Lu writes, “The postmodern politics of difference, or "identity politics," boils 
down to the issue of "cultural identity"—the issue of "Chineseness" in relation to the 
Eurocentric narrative of history, modernization, and capital.” (Lu, 42) Western cultural 
theorists have identified a clear delineation between modernism (which has its roots in the 
European Enlightenment, and drew to a close in post-WWII Europe and North America) and 
postmodernism (which has it’s roots in French poststructuralist philosophy of the 1960’s, 
globalisation and a consumer culture) (Lu, 2001). What makes cultural analysis of China so 
interesting, on the other hand, is the interconnectedness of the two; for China, both 
ideological forces have their roots in the attempts to modernise China through the 
implementation of radical economic reforms of the New Era (1978-88); since this point, the 
historical and ideological boundaries between modernity and postmodernity have never been 
clear. 
 
Cultural theorist Xudong Zhang wrote,  
Modernism as a specific historical-aesthetic has never been an “established 
form” in the history of modern China but always a cultural intellectual 
striving and a transient, embattled, precarious movement… as in Beijing in 
the 1980’s… Moreover, the socioeconomic condition of the ephemeral 
Chinese high-modernism – namely, Chinese (bourgeois or socialist) 
modernity and modernization – is widely considered to be an ongoing 
project yet to run its full course in Chinese and world history. 
 
Curiously, it is this unfinished project of economic , social and cultural modernization1 that 
has, in its uncompromising thirst for progress, sparked the fire of postmodernity, a force set 
on undermining and subverting the very values that allowed it to flourish. To be more 
specific, the high-modernist ambition for a powerful and proudly nationalistic China laid 
down by the Communist Party of China (CPC) has, through the introduction of a free-market 
capitalism, unwittingly opened the door to a more pluralistic and globalised society (Zhang 
2008). 
 
The beguiling and seemingly paradoxical situation within which these opposing ideologies 
have been forced to coexist has led to the drawing of political battle lines. Zhang writes of a 
“strong intellectual opposition” to postmodernism defined almost entirely in terms of national 
politics: 
For those who believe in the mandate of enlightenment, modernization and 
statehood, postmodernism is not only a heresy vis-à-vis the officially 
sanctioned intellectual discourse of the New Era, it is, more importantly, 
an alternative mode of cultural production in the realm of mass culture 
which threatens the cohesiveness of the ideologico-discursive hegemony 
of the state. (Zhang 2008 157)  
 
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, it has led to a fragmented and disoriented 
middle class who find themselves in a “commodity world compatible with global capitalism” 
(Zhang, 2008, 72) that is at odds with the social and cultural “plane of consistence” (Delueze 
1966) still meditated by the Chinese nation-state. 
 
On the first floor of White Rabbit is a work by Zhu Jinshi, titled “DIARY: 25.12.06.” The 
work is an installation, containing a large canvass half smothered in red oil paint and a 
shovel, also covered in red paint, resting against the canvas. By the artist’s own admission, 
the work is abstract, realistic and conceptual, containing elements of “history, society and 
politics.” (White Rabbit, 2009). Having lived in Germany for many years, his art suggests 
confrontations and alternating perspectives and: the encounter and (cultural) exchange 
between East and West, communism and capitalism, past and present. Jinshi’s work conveys 
a sense of impassioned opposition and inner turmoil. The artist has stated that red signifies 
both capitalism and communism; the rolling dollops of red paint convey a sense that the artist 
has committed to a complete extraction of his energy and belief into the confrontation 
between ideologies. As the ideological contradiction between the official party doctrine and 
                                                
1 Influential German social and political theorist Jurgen Habermas believed modernization to 
be a combination of a cumulative and mutually reinforcing process: the formation of capital 
and the mobilization of resources; the development of production and productivity; the 
establishment of centralized political power and the formation of national identities. (He 
Ping, China’s Search For Modernity, 2002) 
the nation’s liberal economic policy, it would be interesting to know if the artist has his own 
stance on the issue. In one of the blank white corners there is a small inscription of Chinese 
characters, which translate, “Art is important, but China is more important!” Is Jinshi sincere 
or is this a statement of cynicism and sarcastic jest? 
 
Zhang has suggested that “Chinese modernity is losing its grip on Chinese daily life” (Zhang 
2008). However, having witnessed recently the 60th anniversary of Communist Party rule in 
China, one cannot help but reconsider this. 200 000 citizens were part of a mass pageant, 
while 100 000 members of the Peoples Liberation Army supervised, on the look out for any 
suspicious activity. Beijing residents were advised prior to the parade “ not to go out on Oct. 
1 to avoid complications.” This event was not for them: it was a celebration for the party, 
whose grasp on China seems as strong as ever. Although, perhaps these sorts of conclusions 
are exactly the kind the Party is hoping to elicit; a reaction of awe and intimidation based 
more on superficial appearances of power than on a deeper understanding of the way the 
Party’s is really upheld by its citizens.  
 
All this recalls the original question: how has this mounting ideological tension affected 
China’s sense of identity? How has this fragmentation of China’s cultural continuity affected 
the way China defines itself? Before these questions can be answered directly, it is still 
necessary to engage in a more thorough discussion of the profound ways in which 
postmodernity has disrupted Chinese society. Two phenomenon, in particular, are central in 
this attempt to understand the legacy of postmodernism in China’s recent history: firstly, the 
melding, in almost every social sphere, of mass consumerism and culture, and secondly, the 
explosion of information and the decomposition of the “real” in Chinese consumer society. 
 
Fredric Jameson, author of the highly influential study of the link between Postmodernity and 
global consumerism, “Postmodernism, or, the cultural logic of late capitalism”, asserts that an 
understanding of postmodernity is linked inseparably to global capitalism; he describes this 
more specifically as the “effacement of the older (essentially high-modernist) frontier 
between high culture and so-called mass or commercial culture” (Jameson, 1991). 
Advertising, mass media and entertainment industries have become extensions of commodity 
production in which markets are monopolised to produce a mass culture (Featherstone, 
1995). In other words, culture is no longer autonomous; it has been absorbed by the forces of 
commodity capitalism (Connor, 1997) 
 
Incidentally, Jameson lectured on the subject at Beijing University in 1985, triggering a wave 
of Chinese theoretical discourse on the subject of postmodernity and the emergence of a 
commercialised mass culture. Towards the end of the 1980’s, as the economy continued its 
improvements in leaps and bounds, the evidence was clear: In 1980 there were ten 
advertising agencies in China, but by 1987, there were 7000. Today, there are more than 100 
000 (Tom Doctoroff, 2008). The dissemination of marketed fantasies had by the end of the 
1980’s created a nascent mass culture, eager to embrace “TV serials, MTV, popular 
literature, pop music, fashion shows and karaoke” (Lu 35). Jameson has described this as “an 
explosion: a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at 
which everything in our social life – from economic value and state power to practices and to 
the very structure of the psyche itself – can be said to have become “cultural” (Cultural 
Logic, 87). This profound debasement of the concept of “culture” in China is extremely 
relevant to a study of Chinese cultural identity and could, very easily, be seen as a destructive 
force. On the contrary, debate amongst academics in China see the changes as a positive step 
towards a less aggressively modern and more pluralistic society; in particular, Chinese 
literary critics such as Wang Yichuan and Dai Jinhua believe the creativity of the mass 
culture has freed China from elitist restraints and the stilting divisions between “high” and 
“low” culture. (Zhang, 76). 
 
Accessory to the ascendance in China of a culture based on commodity and capital has been 
the rise of the “bubble economy” (Zhang) of images, signs and representation. These virtual 
symbols of status do not correspond to an item’s an intrinsic material value, but rather to an 
associated symbolic value of individuality, freedom, sex appeal, etc that is socially conferred 
(Barthes 1959). The concept is summed up by Guy Debord’s assertion that “The image has 
become the final form of commodity reification.” The change in what has been socially 
considered valuable from the physical to that which merely reproduces or simulates the 
physical is a further way in which postmodernity has radically altered the cultural landscape 
of China, and the second to be discussed in this article. French postructuralist Jean 
Baudrillard has written extensively about impact of simulation in society, focussing in 
particular on the media as the system which, through advertising, “devours meaning.” 
Baudrillard blames the media for setting up a self-contained, simulated hyperreality that no 
longer has any connection to reality whatsoever:  
It is a circular process – that of simulation, that of the hyperreal. By 
becoming more real than the real, the concept of the real is abolished. Both 
communication and “the social” function in a closed circuit, as a lure – to 
which the force of myth is attached. Belief, faith in information attach 
themselves to this tautological proof that the system gives of itself by 
doubling the signs of an unlocatable reality. (Simulation and Simulacra, 
1985) 
 
On level one of White Rabbit is a work by Zhou Xiaohu, titled Renown. Zhou Xiaohu stands 
the casually before a film crew, speaking in Chinese of the need for suspicion when images 
presented by the media. But is the interview really taking place? Upon closer inspection it 
becomes clear that the camera crew are fully clothed (and incredibly life-like) models; Zhou 
Xiaohu himself is nothing more than a moving hologram projected onto a life-sized 
mannequin. Xiaohu’s work is a self-reflexive warning to his “audience”  about the 
hyperreality “projected” by the mass media.  In the interview White Rabbit conducted with 
Xiaohu, he speaks of the perfection of a system based on simulacra. Digital media promise a 
perfect record of events, he suggests, but in doing so create the possibility for perfect 
falsification, “Such is the power of media and communication tools that they can transcend 
truth itself.” 
 
The 60th Anniversary celebrations reveal more about the concept of reality in China today. 
Currently playing in cinemas around the country, the lavishly produced propaganda film, The 
Founding of a Republic, tells (one side) of a story about the ascendance of the Chairman 
Mao, the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China. In one scene, a lone 
soldier straightens his back and bellows, “I’m with the Mountain Pagoda regiment in this 
military parade. I represent the soldiers of the Red Army. The living and the dead. I salute 
you, Chairman Mao”. Mao, having just won the last and battle of north that signifies the final 
unification of China for the first time in 100 years, raises his hand in reply and fights back a 
tear. John Garnaut, writing in the Sydney Morning Herald, reported that during the 
preparations for the military parade, all migrant workers and homeless had been banished 
from Beijing; similarly all rats and mosquitoes had been eradicated from the Chinese capital 
(Garnaut, 2009). What is the significance of all these trivial details? The Communist Party of 
China is interested in creating an illusion of power and control, underpinned by a hegemonic 
manipulation of reality. According to Garnaut, “The Communist Party intends even to defeat 
the weather with the help of cloud seeding aircraft and fog dispersing vehicles.” By 
converting the memory of Mao into a flawless, immortal icon; by purging a city entirely of its 
biological imperfections; by manipulating even the atmosphere to ensure the clear skies all 
for the creation a perfected image of Chinese prestige and glory, the Chinese state has created 
the perfect example of hyperreality, a system of nationalistic signs that form a closed circuit 
which “envelopes the whole edifice of representation itself as a simulacrum.” (Simulation 
and Simulacra, 3) Just as Zhou Xiaohu projects a holographic simulation of his own image 
onto an empty form, the Party has projected it’s identity into the empty space left by the 
nonexistence of any political opposition. The Party is a perfect simulacra projecting an 
identity with an “unlocatable reality” (Baudrillard, 1981); an identity whose real truth no 
longer exists, or only still remains by only by virtue of the copies it has produced to replenish 
the cycle of hyperreality. 
 
Although the concept of Chinese identity has been in focus throughout the article, having 
examined the nature and impact of the forces of modernity, and in particular, postmodernity 
in Chinese society and culture, we can begin to look more directly at the ways in which these 
have influenced the way in which China defines itself today. Up until this point the analysis 
of China’s cultural identity has been fairly theoretical; from this point on, in an attempt to 
bring the article back to the level of Chinese experience, the discussion will take a more 
humanistic approach. 
 
One of the hallmarks of China today is a certain fragmentation and emotional dislocation 
from much of the  from its cultural history and “traditional” Chinese identity. Despite the best 
efforts of the Party hold the people to its extremely narrow metanarrative of progress and 
modernization, Chinese society has undoubtedly become more decentred and pluralistic. for 
China, this is a very unfamiliar position; as one of the world’s oldest unbroken civilizations it 
had, prior to the demise of imperial China in 1911, a  legacy of over two thousand years of 
centralised authority. While global capitalism “flaunts its centreless ubiquity” (Connor), 
China, unlike many other Western nations which have been undergoing projects of 
modernization in one form or another since the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century or 
earlier, has found itself trying to put the pieces of its cultural identity back together after a 
particularly turbulent recent history that has seen a rampant socio-cultural change as a result 
of the forces of both modernity and postmodernity.  
 
To get any real sense, from a humanistic point of view, of China’s cultural identity today, it is 
so important to consider the collective (and individual) relationship they share with their 
cultural history and memory. Ban Wang, author of “Illuminations from the Past; Trauma, 
Memory and History in Modern China”, has attempted to call forward a more nuanced 
conceptualisation of history that gives space for the “vague, telescopic reminisces and 
symbolic details” of memory and the acceptance of any trauma associated with it (Wang 
2006). Wang notes that the grand narrative depicted in the Chinese discursive representation 
of history has pushed memory aside, seeing it as a “backward drag” on the modernisation 
project.  
 
Wang observes a collective trauma in today’s generation of Chinese pertaining, firstly, to the 
latent memory of past catastrophes of imperialism and colonialism, as well as the atrocities of 
the authoritarian political order, and secondly, to the impact of transnational capital and the 
commodification of social relations that has “flattened history into a bloodless, depthless 
simulacra” (Illuminations, 12). Similarly, Jameson identifies the failure of historicity to value 
the subtlety and unpredictable depth of memory. He writes “Our contemporary social system 
has lost its capacity to know its own past, living in a perpetual present without depth, 
definition or secure identify.” (Postmodernism and Consumer Society, 125). For the Chinese 
people, this shared memory of cultural fragmentation has “broken the threads, which in the 
past, had woven human beings into social textures”. An for the fragmentation and 
appreciation for the way in which China is bound, albeit painfully, by this shared historical 
fragmentation offers a different, more subtle definition of China’s cultural identity.  
 
On the first floor of White Rabbit is a work by Dai Hua titled “I Love Tiananmen In Beijing” 
(2006). The work is a digital art work in a “retro” animation style reminiscent of early 2D 
computer games.  The piece is enormous, (over one metre high and five metres in length) 
portraying a panoramic view of Chinese State history over the past 500 years. Rather than 
conveying a sense of collective trauma by emphasising the subtlety, depth and diversity of 
the Chinese experience in the 21st century, Dia Hua does the opposite. In a very playful 
manner, Hua has destroyed all visual (and historical) perspective. Events that may have 
historical significance are treated no differently to events of lesser historical significance; all 
are standardised and flattened with a comical and colourful, pixelated appearance. The iconic 
image of the boy standing before the line of tanks at the Tiananmen square protests are 
represented so infinitesimally it almost escapes attention altogether; the image of a dog 
walking a naked human nearby is far more eye-catching. Where Ban Wang sincerely 
expresses her concerns about the state of China’s cultural identity, Dai Hua subverts and 
parodies and perhaps even embraces a past that has “become nothing but a vast collection of 
images, a multitudinous photographic simulacrum” (Postmodernist Culture, 174) and what 
Baudrillard describes as a “depthless surface, unlimited reproducibility, and radical 
decentredness.” (Simulation and Simulacra, 44). Hua’s playful sense of humour in the face of 
a hegemonic state and the insidious invasion into China of a globalised, mass, consumer 
culture seems to reveal something deeper of the Chinese spirit and resilience.  
 
The effects of modernity and postmodernity in China have been, and continue to be, nothing 
short of spectacular. Their coordinated assault on the cultural legacy of pre-“New Era” China 
has brought both profound positives and negatives to political, economic and cultural 
landscape of the communist nation. And yet, remarkably, China has managed to maintain its 
unique cultural identity. And what is this identity? The art works in White Rabbit provide a 
glimpse of a new nation that is pluralistic, audacious and vibrant in the face of radical cultural 
change. China has discovered the power of the individual. It seems apt to quote Mao, who in 
a lecture to the people at the Yennan Forum in 1942 on literature and the arts, hinted at the 
importance of an ability to remain adaptable, while preserving the essential fabric of their 
social unity and cultural identity: 
We should take over the rich legacy and the good tradition in literature and 
art that have been handed down from past ages in China and foreign 
countries, but the aim must still be to serve the masses of the people. Nor 
do we refuse to utilize the literary and artistic reforms of the past, but it is 
in our hands these old forms, remoulded and infused with new content, 
also become something revolutionary in the service of the people. 
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